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What Smartness Does in the Smart City: From Visions to Policy 
Abstract: This article examines what smartness does on the ground by examining 
how its anticipatory media visions have been interpreted and acted on in policy 
decisions and local implementations since the early 2000s. Using a comparative-
historical analysis that draws on fieldwork in aspiring smart cities in the United 
States and Europe, we argue that the visions of smartness are neither singular 
nor fixed across time and space. Instead, the role of smartness in diffusing new 
technologies is recruited and reshaped in the present to lend legitimacy to future 
public and private interventions. We first demonstrate that the narrative of crisis, 
often associated with smartness, shifted from a pre-2008 emphasis on 
sustainability and climate change to a post-financial crisis engagement with 
entrepreneurship and platformization. We then discuss how the development of 
smart city initiatives has followed divergent paths in the United States and 
Europe, with big tech companies dominating in the former and the ‘living lab’ 
model prevailing in the latter. Our analysis highlights the importance of 
investigating the complex relationships between anticipatory media visions of 
smartness and their varying, down-to-earth implementations in the built 
environment rather than solely focusing on the discursive appeal of techno-
idealism. It also explains the enduring appeal of smartness as an urban vision, 
despite its various shortcomings, by revealing its adaptability to the changing 
social and political–economic shifts. 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the smart city has emerged as a space in which 
anticipations and calculations about societal futures are constructed in the 
present (Albino et al., 2015; Cocchia and Dameri, 2016; Halpern et al., 2017). The 
growing scholarship in this area has demonstrated that smartness, as a particular 
urban vision, emboldens the kind of technological idealism that promotes 
efficiency and innovation across urban spaces (Hollands, 2015). Policymakers 
also believe that smartness can be a pathway to ‘more interactive and responsive 
city administration’ (European Commission, 2018). Well-established critiques of 
the smart city take issue with these socio-technical imaginaries, which falsely 
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amplify local challenges to justify media technologies as the only viable solution 
(de Waal et al., 2017; Green, 2019; Greenfield, 2013; Mattern, 2017a). Urban issues 
are too complicated to be solely managed by technological affordances, which 
are already embedded in the dominant structures of power and politics. The 
vision of an integrated urban dashboard that monitors local operations in real 
time may understandably appeal to overworked public officials, but the record 
of cybernetic attempts at urban control since the 20th century is at best 
ineffectual (Light, 2003; Mattern, 2013; Vallianatos, 2015). Moreover, the current 
incarnations of data-powered visions of local governance still leave a lot to be 
desired when it comes to how they conceive of the city as a site of everyday 
democracy (Araya, 2015; Burdett, 2013; Graham, 2018). 
Yet smartness remains a powerful vision pervading hundreds of urban 
centers around the world. Its claims and promises may be exaggerated, 
nonetheless its future-minded hyperbole is persuasive enough to prompt 
significant material and symbolic investments across cities. Funds are reshuffled, 
regulations are adjusted, new collaborations are initiated among different 
groups, new infrastructural projects are implemented. As public officials and 
local entrepreneurs take up the logics and practices of smartness, they even 
reshape the layout of cities, demarcating some neighborhoods as innovation 
districts or smart city test beds. 
Rather than taking these visions of the smart city at face value, this article 
addresses what smartness does on the ground by examining how these visions 
are interpreted and acted on in policy decisions and local implementations. We 
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pursue a comparative-historical approach and draw on fieldwork in aspiring 
smart cities as well as analyses of corporate and policy documents in the United 
States and Europe. We suggest that actors at the core of the smart city – public 
officials, tech companies, and engaged residents – justify and mobilize smartness 
not just as a remarkable fantasy but also as a pragmatic response to immediate 
problems. Contrary to conventional framings that position smartness as rational, 
universal, and predominantly market-driven, our interlocutors understand it as a 
possible solution to the everyday failings of urban infrastructures as well as an 
opportunity to generate collaborations across various stakeholders. Smartness 
becomes embedded in practical responses to shifting structural conditions of 
managing cities rather than purely celebrating technologies for their own sake or 
solely projecting futuristic assertions. 
As Jathan Sadowski and Roy Bendor (2019) argue, smartness in an urban 
context typically starts from a language of crisis wherein the anticipation of a 
dystopian future warrants preemptive preparation in the present, enabled by 
technological capabilities of real-time sensing and data processing. Yet this crisis 
narrative is neither singular nor fixed across time and space. We argue that the 
role of smartness in diffusing new technologies is recruited and reshaped in the 
present to lend legitimacy to various public and private interventions on behalf 
of perceived future needs. We first demonstrate how the narrative of crisis 
shifted from a pre-2008 emphasis on sustainability and climate change to a post-
financial crisis engagement with entrepreneurship, innovation, and the building 
of ‘regional innovation ecosystems’ (Committee of the Regions, 2016). We then 
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discuss how the development of smart city initiatives has followed divergent 
paths in the United States and Europe, with big tech companies dominating in 
the former and the ‘living lab’ model prevailing in the latter. 
These two comparative dimensions (one operating across time, the other 
across geography) allow us to establish that the visions of smartness are flexible 
means to pursue stability in unstable times. We thus challenge the views that the 
utopian and dystopian visions of the smart city are accepted by local 
governments because of a blind faith in techno-determinism or complete reliance 
on urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). Instead smartness, as a set of 
technologies, new sources of funding, and a branding strategy, helps local 
governments articulate pragmatic solutions in the immediate present to 
structurally thorny urban problems. Many public officials turn to smart 
technologies to funnel attention and funds to repair flailing urban systems in the 
absence of public funding and political action. Our argument does not reject the 
very well-established critiques of the smart city, which have effectively 
showcased how corporate visions of smartness are mere attempts to sell 
surveillance technologies and data analytics to local governments. We also do 
not argue that smart technologies are indeed the solutions that they profess to be. 
On the contrary, our research projects in US and European cities have so far 
concluded that these new systems have a long way to go to deliver the results 
they have promised to espouse (Baykurt, 2019). Despite these shortcomings, our 
contribution reveals why the visions of smartness remain appealing to cities by 
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identifying their adaptability to the changing social and political–economic shifts 
on the ground. 
In the following pages, we first present a brief overview of what kind of 
urban visions undergird smartness and how urban temporalities mediate its 
socio-technical imaginaries. We then revisit the recent history of how US-origin 
tech companies have interpreted smartness, and contrast this with living lab 
methodologies present across the European Union (EU) to discuss how visions of 
smartness have shifted and how smartness is operationalized differently. We 
conclude the article by examining the relationships between anticipatory media 
visions of the smart city and the varying, down-to-earth implementations in the 
built environment. 
 
2. Temporalities of Smartness: Between Crisis and Utopia  
Even though smart cities are all the rage these days, they still lack a clear 
definition. Based on a comprehensive analysis of corporate and academic 
documents on the subject, the Focus Group in Smart Sustainable Cities of the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) found more than a hundred 
definitions of what ‘smart city’ can mean (ITU-T Focus Group on Smart 
Sustainable Cities, 2014). A similar study concluded that smart cities ‘lack 
universality’ as each city launches smartness with different visions or objectives 
(Albino et al., 2015: 18). Along with alternate descriptors, such as ‘intelligent’ or 
‘responsive’ cities, smart cities represent shifting assumptions about the 
relationship between urban environments and technology, especially by 
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anticipating ‘post-anthropocentric cities of tomorrow’ (Yigitcanlar et al., 2017: 
150). 
Despite the lack of precision in definitions, smartness in public 
imagination usually conjures up a networked environment that can automate 
and respond to everyday human behavior. Think about your Wi-Fi-connected 
smart phone, houses, and, of course, streets. Yet, as Halpern et al. (2017) explain, 
the appeal of smartness lies not only in its infrastructural capacity via computing 
but also in ‘an orienting telos about what smartness is and does’ (p. 108). 
Recognizing a decisive break from the Cold War notions of centralized control, 
the authors suggest smartness offers ‘neither reason nor rationality’ (Halpern et 
al., 2017: 110), as it elevates resilience and optimization above all else. By 
constantly experimenting with data models and real-time information, smartness 
envisions sustainability as the outcome of the continual testing and tweaking of 
data analysis in city spaces. In other words, the world-making power of 
smartness is derived from a remarkable presence on the ground in the form of 
wires, sensors, cameras, and dashboards that promise to capture everyday life in 
granular detail, and what people can potentially do with that data to solve urban 
problems. 
The socio-technical imaginary of the smart city is not limited to mere 
techno-utopianism but also depends on a ‘language of crisis’ (Halpern et al, 2017: 
108). Corporate documents by the leaders in the smart city market, IBM and 
Cisco, perennially follow the same narrative: ‘[S]toke a crisis (or three), theorize a 
framework for transforming the city, marshal solutions to fix what ails city 
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clients, and strategize about different implementation styles’ (Sadowski and 
Bendor, 2019: 556). The technical capabilities of smart technologies are important 
to make a case for their adoption in a city. But it is the intentionally magnified 
complexity of local problems that ostensibly makes smartness essential. For the 
municipalities that have to deal with too many local challenges at the same time, 
the promise of smartness to solve many problems at once is alluring. Similarly 
appealing are the dashboards that seem to integrate the disjointed fragments of 
local services, as public officials need to respond to demands for efficient service 
delivery with shrinking public resources. 
We suggest that the utopian and dystopian visions of the smart city – or 
what Sadowski and Bendor (2019) call the ‘visionary and reactionary’ elements 
of smartness – are mediated by a variety of temporalities. For one, smart 
technologies are branded as a convincing way to bring the future into the present 
city. Potential scenarios of complex urban problems along with pressing 
yearnings for social change become mechanisms to manage the future and 
present claims of smart technologies. Municipalities and tech companies draw on 
some of the immediate urban issues, such as decaying water pipes, an urgent 
traffic management problem, or even an upcoming request for (procurement) 
proposal, as opportunities to test future technologies. They also invoke 
prospective concerns with climate change, energy scarcity, security, and 
economic decline to legitimize smart technologies even when their impact for 
justice and equity is dismal at the moment (Goodman and Powles, 2019). 
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These various temporalities of smartness are not solely discursive; they 
are also dependent on a whole stack of material infrastructures, such as pipes, 
cables, data centers, and urban dashboards (Graham, 2018). Cities embed various 
data collection devices across urban centers to assess the likelihood of future 
behaviors or events. This ‘anticipatory governance’ model focuses on the future 
while extensively using past and real-time data (Kitchin, 2014). In addition to 
acting on intelligence from past and present data collection, the smart city also 
tries to manage its everyday life. As much as it is about anticipating futures, the 
‘real-time city’ is also about keeping the pulse of urban life through live feeds of 
‘…road traffic sensors, pollution monitors, flood sensors [that] are appropriated 
within a very immediate time-frame to manage the here-and-now’ (Leszczynski, 
2016: 1693). It is usually in the mixing of statistical models with messy real-time 
and past data that we most clearly see the disjunct temporalities of smartness – 
and the limits of what it can and cannot do. In other words, smartness does not 
just oscillate between dystopian and utopian visions; it simultaneously moves 
between the past, present, and the future to legitimize itself and make smart 
technologies look useful to policymakers, researchers, and citizens. 
By inquiring into what smartness does in the city, we aim to demonstrate 
how these conflicting narratives and disjointed temporalities mobilize divergent 
resources in the present and legitimate (or delegitimate) certain local problems in 
the future. We trace these shifts both across time and space to comparatively 
analyze the diverse premises and promises of smartness. We thus challenge the 
assumption that the persuasive capacity of smartness depends solely on its 
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discourses and imaginaries. Pragmatic considerations and collaborations 
(Cocchia and Dameri, 2016) are equally important in stabilizing the 
overwhelming appeal of smartness. Our approach allows to examine how 
visions are operationalized in response to actual, day-to-day problems and 
demonstrate how seemingly universal trajectories of futures are animated within 
varying cultural, social, and political conditions. The point is neither to follow 
nor debunk a particular vision of the future in which media technologies play a 
central role. We aim to show that the negotiation around central tenets of future 
visions reveals both diverse assessments of current state of affairs and the 
complex relationship between media technologies and their future-making 
capacity. 
 
3. From Climate Change to Urban Platforms: Smartness as Permanently Beta 
Despite the tech industry’s repeated hype about algorithms, artificial intelligence, 
and machine learning, the early visions about the smart city were focused on 
something different: climate change. No company was politically bold enough to 
spell it out explicitly, but energy scarcity and sustainability were at the center of 
both Cisco and IBM’s initial propositions about smart cities in the early 2000s. In 
2006, former US President Bill Clinton, through the Clinton Foundation’s global 
initiative, asked Cisco to act on climate change. That is how Cisco committed the 
first 15  million US dollars to launching the Connected Urban Development 
(CUD) program, which later became the backbone of its smart cities initiatives. 
CUD originally aimed to increase the efficiency of traffic flow via new 
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technologies, thereby reducing carbon emissions. It was launched in a number of 
global cities, including San Francisco, Seoul, Amsterdam, Madrid, and Hamburg. 
Hoping to model cities after the so-called infrastructural efficiency of the Internet 
at the time, Cisco declared, ‘Our fundamental belief is that today’s flow of 
people, goods, energy, information, media, and services in cities can be as 
efficient as the traffic of digital packets on the internet’ (Villa and Mitchell, 2009: 
6). 
IBM’s foray into smart cities was no different. The company’s then 
president and CEO Samuel Palmisano announced their vision for a ‘Smarter 
Planet’ in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in 2008. Peddling a 
similar crisis narrative for cities that were facing ‘a range of challenges and 
threats to their sustainability across all their core systems that they need to 
address holistically’, IBM’s program suggested that a smart city ‘uses technology 
to transform its core systems and optimize the return from largely finite 
resources’ (Dirks and Keeling, 2009). Again, there was no explicit reference to 
climate change, but there was a nod to ‘a crisis of global scale’ (Sadowski and 
Bendor, 2019: 550) and a planetary vision for smartness from the outset. 
These leading companies in the smart city market started shifting their 
narratives and organizational structures around 2009. In February 2009, Cisco 
declared that the CUD program was evolving into a ‘Smart and Connected 
Communities’ (S+CC) initiative’. Much bolder than simply providing efficiency, 
Cisco’s new program expanded to ‘enable economic, social and environmental 
sustainability and transform communities, cities and countries’ (Chakrabarti, 
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2011). Then CEO of Cisco, John Chambers described this transformation for the 
company as ‘mov[ing] from plumbing to being the platform for innovation’ 
(Lindsay, 2010). Rather than merely selling hardware such as routers, Cisco was 
venturing into computing and data analytics to come up with innovative 
solutions for urban problems. Similarly, IBM acquired 25 analytics firms between 
2008 and 2013 (McNeil, 2015). The company also launched a Smarter Cities 
Technology Center in Dublin in 2011 to ‘solve problems such as pollution, 
resource inefficiencies, unreliability, crime, and social inequities’ (IBM, 2011). 
In just a few years, smartness, at least in corporate speak, shifted from a 
vision with a narrow focus on the efficiency-providing capabilities of 
technologies to one that emphasized innovation, community-building, and 
constant experimentation. These visions first became concrete in each company’s 
attempt to institute smart cities outside the Unites States. On a landfill on the 
northwestern coast of South Korea, Cisco wired up the city of Songdo to 
prototype various urban technologies: video-conferences in all buildings, mobile-
phone-controlled residences, a customized public transit system, and a waste 
management system that eliminates trash cans on street corners (Halpern et al., 
2013). IBM partnered with the city of Rio de Janeiro to open the Rio Operations 
Center in the end of 2010. The Center aimed to centralize urban management by 
integrating data from 30 different agencies and creating a monitoring system for 
public safety as well as other issues, such as traffic control, infrastructural 
maintenance, and emergency management (Gaffney and Robertson, 2018). ‘We 
don’t have to wait for the resolution of ideological debates to make our city 
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systems smarter’, asserted IBM’s then CEO Palmisano in 2011, ‘if these city 
leaders share an ideology, it is this, “We believe in a smarter way to get things 
done”’ (Palmisano, 2011). In these new versions of smartness, there was less 
emphasis on sustainability and energy savings, and more focus on retrofitting 
the urban environment, restructuring local governance, and promising 
innovation for cities. 
The idealism of the so-called smart city, at least as articulated by tech 
companies, has transformed from a concern with climate change and 
sustainability to an aspiration toward a vaguer alternative, that is, innovation 
and experimentation. Especially in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis 
of 2008/2009 (Sadowski, 2019; Tay, 2019; Townsend, 2013), this change of mind 
on the side of companies owes to the changing political economy of cities. With 
its combination of venture capital, technocratic governance, and seductive 
promise of innovation, smartness became music to the ears of local governments 
that were hit hard by austerity measures. As many cities grappled with the 
exodus of residents and businesses, local governments scrambled for already-
limited resources. Meanwhile, decaying urban infrastructures increasingly 
became public concerns, and tech companies saw an opportunity to offer services 
in response to austerity. IBM was quite explicit about this strategy: ‘2008 ushered 
in a systemic and prolonged economic adjustment that has severely crippled the 
ability of governments to deliver expected services to citizens, let alone push for 
innovative, new services’, the company proclaimed while introducing its data 
analytics as a solution (IBM, 2012 cited in Sadowski, 2019). Similarly, Cisco was 
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publishing research papers which pointed out that ‘[F]ragilities in the global 
financial system threaten to stall, if not reverse, years of economic progress’, and 
that smart technologies had the ‘potential to rectify many of the challenges’ 
(Evans, 2012). As Sadowski (2019) succinctly puts it, these companies, post-2008, 
exploited the austerity of many cities, particularly in the United States, to push 
smartness into urban environments. 
Positioning themselves as advisers to local governments and offering tech-
savvy advice, corporations began to value, in both meanings of the word, 
decaying infrastructures, austere budgets, and discontented residents. Through 
public–private partnerships, they started taking stock of cities’ problems, urban 
assets, and data inventories while connecting entrepreneurial groups with 
investors. At a time when local governments were adapting to a new level of 
‘doing more with less’, the promise of smartness to generate efficiencies, attract 
capital, create new business, and become attractive for young, middle-class 
residents became wildly appealing. As new smart technologies were built into 
existing infrastructures of cities, public officials were also able to point to 
concrete changes in the urban environment as signs of improvement. 
Around the same time, many tech companies and even municipal leaders 
also started articulating smartness as a way to think about cities as platforms. A 
platform, in broad strokes, refers to a flexible physical layer with adaptable 
software, which encouraged smart city enthusiasts to see city infrastructures in a 
new light. In July 2015, the Aspen Institute held a 2-day gathering with 
academics, policymakers, and tech executives to discuss this metaphor. 
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Reporting on the meeting, Charles M Firestone of the Aspen Institute gave a 
lengthy description of what it means for cities to think and act like a platform: 
‘…cities can leverage digital and network technologies, tapping the expertise of 
its many citizens and stakeholders, to work for solutions to urban problems, co-
create new activities, and engage citizens more directly in the city’s work and 
play. They can use open data, crowdsourcing and urban prototyping to enhance 
both government services and enjoyment of local life in the city’ (Bollier, 2016). 
The prevailing trend toward platformization in various areas of life (Goodman 
and Powles, 2019; Helmond, 2015; Nieborg and Poell, 2018; van Dijck et al., 2018) 
propelled not just municipalities but also local entrepreneurial communities and 
nonprofits to replicate what they perceive as an innovation strategy in urban 
environments. 
For tech companies in the smart city market, a platform has become 
simultaneously an organizing metaphor and an actual infrastructure. Arvind 
Satyam, a managing director at Cisco, once suggested that it was important for 
cities to create an ‘innovation platform’, for example, which he described as a 
combination where ‘large companies work with startups and local entrepreneurs 
as well as work with local government’. Cisco’s product portfolio for cities also 
includes ‘Kinetic’, which the company describes as ‘a single pane of glass [that] 
lets you view and manage data from the lighting, parking, traffic, waste 
management, and Wi-Fi deployments’ in the city. Kinetic collects data from 
various city systems and devices, using wired and wireless connectivity. By 
transmitting data to the cloud and storing enormous amounts of information, 
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Kinetic then renders urban intelligence available for analysis by other parties. 
Similar to what AirBnB suggests for housing or Uber/Lyft for transportation, 
companies such as Cisco or Alphabet’s Sidewalk Labs increasingly offers 
‘platforms’ – again as material systems as well as logics and visions – as a viable 
model to think about urbanism. 
Rather than empty venerations of shiny new technologies or constant 
corporate propaganda, we thus suggest that smartness now runs apace in 
hundreds of cities because its vision ostensibly offers very explicit solutions to 
localities that were hit by austerity, and new tools that promise to collect data 
that might drive innovation. Tech companies position themselves as consultants, 
or partners even, to resource-poor municipalities while providing them with new 
technologies, data analytics, and, in some cases, capital investments. In addition 
to corporate funding, several federal grants during the Obama administration 
and incentives by the National League of Cities have opened up US cities to 
constant experimentation, entrepreneurial undertakings, and civic prototyping 
over the last decade. What started as technocratic steps toward sustainability in 
the early 2000s soon turned into an urban mode of ‘permanently beta’, wherein 
cities constantly collaborate with tech companies and tinker with digital 
technologies in search of innovation (Neff and Stark, 2004). Instead of tackling 
sustainability or climate change, smartness now legitimizes public and private 
interventions that prioritize data collection and optimization without any clearly 
defined expectations or mechanisms of accountability (Goodman and Powles, 
2019). 
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4. Smartness through Living Labs 
While the vision of smartness shifted from sustainability to entrepreneurialism 
and innovation in the United States over the last decade, it has followed a highly 
different path in the fragmented political landscape of the EU. Rather than 
striving for a single smart city as a model, governments and actors in civil society 
as well as industry have gravitated toward working with several models of 
governance and multi-stakeholder engagement around smartness. This different 
approach is explained in part by the heterogenous political climate in the 28 
member states of the EU where the roles and functions of new technologies need 
to be negotiated within multiple (and often conflicting) expectations, legal 
frameworks, levels of expertise, and financial backing. In contrast to industry-led 
initiatives to implement smartness in cities, the peculiar conditions in the EU 
require establishing common frameworks for all member states while including 
local expertise, winning industry support and observing broader policy 
objectives at the same time. 
Another explanation for why smartness is interpreted in terms of a 
participatory, multi-stakeholder policy approach in Europe has to do with the 
long-term investment in social experiments with information technologies since 
the 1980s, especially in Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom (ENoLL, 
2016). The methodology of urban living labs emerged as a way to develop 
technology frameworks that started from a user-oriented perspective, building 
on concrete use cases and satisfying overlapping stakeholder demands. A living 
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lab approach is typically defined as a user-focused design environment, a 
strategy of co-creation, and, increasingly, an institutionalized space wherein 
citizens, administrators, entrepreneurs, and academics come together to develop 
smartness into concrete applications (Karvonen and Heur, 2014). Practitioners of 
the living lab approach emphasize its core principles as fostering trust among 
different actors and focusing on user needs to better understand new 
technologies. Within the immediate local environment, living labs help identify 
and join localized expertise, real-life testing and prototyping with strategic 
networking of resources to address challenges that cannot be solved by single 
cities or departments (Chronéer et al., 2019; Dezuanni et al., 2018; Eskelinen et al., 
2015; McCormick and Hartmann, 2017). 
The living lab methodology goes back to experiments with open 
innovation for technological development at MIT in the late 1990s (Chesbrough, 
2006; Ruijsink and Smith, 2016). In the European context, its roots can be traced 
back to the Scandinavian participatory design from the 1960s, European social 
experiments with information technologies in the 1980s, and various digital city 
initiatives from the 1990s (ENoLL, 2016; Ruiisink and Smith, 2016: 5–7). Current 
smart city initiatives similarly use living labs to enable spaces wherein corporate 
and public actors get together to develop and launch new technologies. Dubbed 
as the ‘quadruple helix model of innovation’ (Carayannis and Campbell, 2009), 
living labs prioritize the identification of user needs, knowledge, and 
competences of multiple stakeholders in technology design, where ‘the 
fulfillment of societal functions becomes central’ (Geels, 2004: 898, emphasis 
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added). This collaborative approach to smartness responds especially to the 
divergent needs of cities in the EU, where fragmented regulatory and legislative 
national frameworks were for a long time perceived as obstacles to global 
competitiveness (European Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise, 
2003). 
The living lab approach was initially envisioned as an enhanced, user-
focused test bed for new technologies in real-live settings. In the European 
context, living labs have now become established as spaces and methods of civic 
innovation and experimentation with future technologies that seek to enhance 
both user acceptance and competitiveness of European industries. A number of 
policy and funding initiatives in the EU since the early 2000s have placed great 
emphasis on the concurrent development of technologies and their functions 
within societal challenges associated with digitization, knowledge dissemination, 
and the design of public services. 
One of the early examples in the domain of smart cities was the Intelcities 
project (2002–2003) that brought together dozens of cities, ICT companies, and 
research groups to prototype urban platforms and information systems (Curwell 
et al., 2005). In addition to the overall goal of achieving a ‘sustainable society in 
smart cities’ (European Commission Directorate-General, 2003: 188), the initiative 
recognized the challenges of digitization, social inclusion, and capacity building 
in local environments. The roadmap developed in the Intelcities project focused 
on the ‘Knowledge Society’ and ‘Sustainable Urban Development’ as long-term 
goals of EU policy. It also addressed how technological issues were linked and 
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shaped by anticipated uses and users, trust, and confidence to achieve 
sustainability (Curwell and Cooper, 2010; Curwell et al., 2005). While the 
proliferation of living labs across European localities was eclectic and dispersed, 
initiatives in this domain explicitly advocated ‘multidisciplinary and 
multicontextual research’ in the design of digital technologies (Leminen et al., 
2017), including collaborations among different sectors and recognizing the need 
for reskilling large segments of the population (European Commission 
Directorate-General, 2003). 
In 2006, the institutionalization of the European Network of Living Labs 
(ENoLL) under the Finnish EU Presidency marked a culmination point of 
various policy, research and development milestones around the transformative 
role of ICTs in all domains of society since the 1980s (Ruijsink and Smith, 2016a, 
2016b: 14–16). The European policy initiative ‘i2010’ solidified the living lab 
approach as the guiding principle for developing and implementing new 
technologies and set to establish a network of living labs across the continent to 
‘support the provision of services for broadly-based innovation deployment to 
industry, bringing technology test beds into real-life user environments’ (Office 
for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006: 13). Combining 
open innovation principles with the tradition of Scandinavian participatory 
design (Ehn, 2018), the living labs set out to investigate changing relations 
between work, technologies, and skills in information-based and increasingly 
digital work environments. They aimed to bring together academics with unions, 
workers, and employers while ‘striving to redefine democracy as much as they 
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are about redefining design practices and relations in design’ (Gregory, 2003: 71). 
Living labs thus endeavored to achieve more than test beds for new technologies; 
they offered ways to engage citizens in co-creating public infrastructures, 
applications, and new forms of governance (Brynskov et al., 2018 ; Mulder, 2012). 
A few contemporary examples of how European cities implement 
smartness demonstrate the persistence of such living lab practices and civic 
innovation. The ‘Digital Agenda Vienna’ has defined nine principles of 
developing the city for citizens, administration and businesses alike, of which six 
principles are directly oriented to civic issues such as (gender) equality, 
participation, inclusion, and transparency (Stadt Wien, 2015: 6–9). 
Similarly, the German city of Darmstadt has only recently become a model 
city for digital innovation, building on a broad alliance of local research 
institutions and businesses while receiving funding from the German 
Association of ICT Corporations (BITKOM) and the state of Hesse. Many action 
fields in Darmstadt’s strategy are concerned with finding solutions in 
technological domains such as waste, energy, and traffic management, but 
another important goal is to develop citizen services that are ‘easy, accessible and 
[that] strengthen the cohesion of the citizens of Darmstadt’ (Digitalstadt 
Darmstadt, 2018: 10, own translation). The city aims for a ‘digital cultural change’ 
through winning trust and acceptance, fostering curiosity, rapid prototyping, 
and the avoidance of ‘thinking in silos’ (Digitalstadt Darmstadt, 2018: 32–33, own 
translation). 
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Another example is Amsterdam, where the digitization of city services, 
business development, and citizen participation are based on principles of co-
creation, open data, and citywide outreach and communication efforts. Through 
an institution like the DataLab Amsterdam, design approaches such as rapid 
prototyping and co-creation are used to develop solutions that can benefit local 
administrators and the ecosystem of citizens, businesses and civil society to 
mature into scalable solutions (Mora and Bolici, 2017; Zygiaris, 2013). 
These cities differ widely in their ability to muster both visions and 
resources to become responsive to citizen demands for transparency and 
sustainability through locally divergent interpretations of smartness. Their 
attempts to align smartness with civic innovation underline that the 
development of new services and technologies need to co-evolve with public 
engagement. This requires developing and sustaining new networks of 
collaboration across domains to find models of urban governance that are 
adaptive to increased datafication (Claudel, 2018). 
Motivated by the living lab approach, many European localities draw on 
smartness not just for implementing new technologies, but also taking stock of 
their own resources and aspirations, and creating partnerships among 
businesses, civic organizations, local governments, and universities. A living lab 
approach to smartness thus fosters a rather soft, horizontal innovation in social 
relations, knowledge sharing practices and modes of governance by shifting both 
the perceptions (among different stakeholders) and the centrality of 
technological solutions. An evaluation of Living Lab approaches among 
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members of ENoLL finds that the highly context-specific identification of needs, 
the mobilization of ‘tacit knowledge’ of actors, and the governance within 
public–private partnerships all contribute to enhancing the legitimacy of this 
approach to innovation (Alam and Porras, 2018; Almirall et al., 2012; cf. Bifulco et 
al., 2017). 
The rollout of living labs was rather organic across European localities, 
but policy frameworks and public funding provided by the EU since the early 
2000s played a key role in establishing civic innovation as the guiding principle 
for technology development. While smartness may have emerged as an 
ostensibly universal framing of how cities take up digital infrastructures in 
recent years, European municipalities were already well versed in – and 
incentivized to – establishing new kinds of ‘democratic ecologies’ (Araya, 2015; 
cf. Burdett, 2013) among government, citizens, businesses, and society at large in 
technology design and implementation. The uptake of smartness as civic 
innovation and living labs in Europe, in contrast to entrepreneurialism in the 
United States, brings to the fore the central role of combining public investment, 
policy objectives, and governance structures in shaping the conditions in which 
smartness matures from a vision into reality. 
Due to the highly context-specific identification of needs and aspiration 
and the long-term strategic goals of cities (if they are defined), cities can assume 
very different roles when it comes to using living lab approaches to put 
smartness to work. These can range from the city level of acting as providers of 
improved services to being catalysts for business development and regional 
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growth. Or cities may position themselves on the neighborhood level to either 
foster local resources and networks or support rapid experimentation to develop 
and test new solutions in local settings with an eye toward scalable services 
(Leminen, et al., 2017: 26–28; cf. von Wirth et al., 2018). Unlike the corporate 
visions, where cities and tech companies struggle over the potentials and limits 
of smartness in a competitive and often ad hoc manner, living lab approaches 
afford municipalities, small and large, with a collaborative effort toward 
innovation, one that serves multiple stakeholder demands co-creatively. At least 
in the European context, such methodologies also open up new kinds of funding 
streams from EU-wide programs while establishing cross-sector partnerships 
between and inside cities. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
While comparing and contrasting visions of the smart city over the last decade in 
a Euro-Atlantic context, we heed Fred Turner’s reminder that, ‘As powerful as 
bits and algorithms are, and as dramatically as new media technologies call for 
new theories…., new media technologies retain a material dimension’ (Turner, 
2014: 257). The material dimension we find in the visions of smartness has two 
legs: first, it refers to the political and economic apparatuses that prompt the 
development of media technologies, and second, it is about the physicality of the 
urban environment that uses smartness to transform itself. Over the last decade, 
the smart city has gone from a corporate buzzword to an all-encompassing 
techno-utopian vision for urbanism in the 21st century to a rather cautious 
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descriptor of what municipalities attempt to accomplish with digital 
technologies. Anticipatory visions undergirding the smart city may simply be a 
marketing strategy on the part of tech companies, or a totalizing promise by 
Silicon Valley that does not quite understand the politics of the city. Our analysis 
took a different turn and examined the variety of ways these visions are 
mobilized and altered by tech companies as well as municipalities. 
We showed that the visions of smartness shifted, even in corporate 
promotions, when the political–economic landscape of cities transformed 
drastically following the financial crisis in 2008. Instead of focusing on climate 
change or sustainability, tech companies reorganized smartness as a viable way 
to foster economic growth and experimentation in places that were already hit 
hard by austerity. By attempting to bring the logics and techniques of digital 
platforms into the city, municipalities and tech companies used smartness 
hoping to revitalize urban infrastructures. European cities may downplay or 
even consciously avoid the term smart these days, but the living lab approach 
similarly has taken up the toolkit of smartness to grapple with complex urban 
problems. Rather than substituting an old technology (e.g. street lights) with a 
new one (e.g. networked, sensor-equipped LEDs), the core of living labs as 
spaces and methodologies is to create environments for collective problem-
solving that addresses conflicting demands of inclusion, equality, accessibility 
and innovation around technological questions. 
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The comparative approach (over time as well as spaces) presented here, 
highlights that different interpretations of smartness also depend on local 
political cultures, the availability of funding structures (venture capital vs. public 
funding), as well as historically shaped conceptions of entrepreneurship and 
civic engagement. Yet, as many cities deal with similar problems, taking visions 
of smartness as mere corporate hype misses an important point. Most cities in the 
early 21st century try to come to terms with both the demands of citizens and the 
technological solutionism aggressively promoted by tech corporations. They try 
to address novel challenges that require new domains of expertise and lack the 
necessary capital and labor for meaningful interventions. These taxing conditions 
do not justify the insufficient public accountability and rapid privatization of 
local governance in any smart city-in-progress. But they may explain the ongoing 
appeal of smartness and why legions of public officials, and even residents, are 
enamored with the idea – even when they are careful not to use the term itself. 
Analyzing what smartness does, instead of solely examining its discourses, 
prompts further studies that investigate the practical, immediate, not to mention 
strategic, uses of smart city visions in localities. 
